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Safety sans Frontie`res: An International Safety
Culture Model
TomW. Reader,1,∗ Mark C. Noort,1 Steven Shorrock,2,3 and Barry Kirwan2
The management of safety culture in international and culturally diverse organizations is a
concern for many high-risk industries. Yet, research has primarily developed models of safety
culture within Western countries, and there is a need to extend investigations of safety cul-
ture to global environments. We examined (i) whether safety culture can be reliably mea-
sured within a single industry operating across different cultural environments, and (ii) if
there is an association between safety culture and national culture. The psychometric proper-
ties of a safety culture model developed for the air traffic management (ATM) industry were
examined in 17 European countries from four culturally distinct regions of Europe (North,
East, South, West). Participants were ATM operational staff (n = 5,176) and management
staff (n = 1,230). Through employing multigroup confirmatory factor analysis, good psycho-
metric properties of the model were established. This demonstrates, for the first time, that
when safety culture models are tailored to a specific industry, they can operate consistently
across national boundaries and occupational groups. Additionally, safety culture scores at
both regional and national levels were associated with country-level data on Hofstede’s five
national culture dimensions (collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculin-
ity, and long-term orientation). MANOVAs indicated safety culture to be most positive in
Northern Europe, less so in Western and Eastern Europe, and least positive in Southern
Europe. This indicates that national cultural traits may influence the development of organi-
zational safety culture, with significant implications for safety culture theory and practice.
KEY WORDS: Air traffic management; European regions; national culture; safety climate; safety
culture
1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of safety culture emerges from
theory and research showing organizational man-
agement, values, norms, activities, and history to
shape employee safety behaviors and outcomes.(1)
For many high-risk industries (e.g., aviation, energy),
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safety management transcends national boundaries,
and is of international concern. This means the con-
ceptual models used to measure and understand
safety culture must be valid for different national
contexts. Yet, safety culture has been primarily
explored within single organizations and (usually
Western) countries.(2) Whilst new research directions
have emerged,(3) safety culture remains largely sep-
arate from other conceptualizations of culture. For
example, research has not established whether safety
culture can be reliably measured in different coun-
tries, or if there is a relationship between safety
culture and national culture. We explore these is-
sues through an investigation of safety culture in
European air traffic management (ATM).
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Safety culture has multiple definitions,(4) but is
generally described as an element of organizational
culture, and refers to the norms, values, and practices
shared by groups in relation to safety and risk.(5–7)
Ambiguities in the definition of safety culture reflect
its diverse empirical and theoretical origins. For ex-
ample, anthropological perspectives emphasize the
role of societal belief systems in determining safety
culture, while normative perspectives emphasize
organizational policies and group interactions.(8)
The safety culture concept is seen as useful because a
“strong” safety culture is where beliefs and activities
in relation to safety are positive, leading to a reduced
likelihood of organizational mishaps. Conversely,
a “weak” safety culture can reflect poor safety
practices, which increases accident probability. Em-
pirical research examining the association between
safety culture and safety performance supports
this assertion,(4,9,10) and thus despite its somewhat
ethereal nature, safety culture is often conceived
as an organizational property that is attainable and
measurable.(11)
This is similar to “safety climate,” and a long-
standing debate within the safety literature is on
the distinction between safety culture and safety
climate.(5) Broadly, safety climate is argued to re-
flect the “surface features of the safety culture . . . .at
a given point in time” (Ref. 12, p. 178), with mea-
sures of safety climate investigating and aggregating
individual perceptions relating to the prioritization
of safety by the organization.(13) These perceptions
are argued to shape the safety-related activities of
organizational members (e.g., through rewarding or
supporting behavior), and thus safety outcomes.(14)
Although safety culture and safety climate have
similar measurement techniques (surveys) and con-
ceptual focus (e.g., prioritization of safety),(1,5,15,16)
safety climate is generally conceptualized as a nar-
rower and more dynamic construct than safety
culture,(17,18) which refers to the more stable and fun-
damental norms, values, and practices that influence
safety. In terms of their relationship, it can be un-
derstood as somewhat akin to personality and mood.
Notably, safety culture research utilizes multiple em-
pirical techniques (e.g., surveys, interviews, incident
analyses), and investigates a wider set of dimensions
than safety climate (e.g., affect, safety knowledge,
values, risk communication).(19)
Crucially, safety culture is understood to emerge
from group, organizational, and societal cultural
practices, and thus is influenced by wider social
contexts.(1,20) This further distinguishes safety culture
from safety climate, yet relatively little research (un-
like in the general organizational culture literature)
has examined whether safety culture interacts with,
and is possibly a product of, constructs such as na-
tional culture.(21–23) Establishing whether safety cul-
ture is associated with wider societal factors such
as national culture would be beneficial in terms of
theory and practice. In particular, it would (i) pro-
vide insight on how national culture might influence
safety culture formation and safety practices, (ii) bet-
ter distinguish safety culture and safety climate, and
(iii) add to an evolving literature on the management
of safety in international contexts.
2.1. Safety Management in an International Context
Increasingly, safety management is performed
internationally, and safety researchers have identi-
fied the challenges this creates.(24,25) First, differences
in safety culture between and within international
organizations (e.g., on risk communication, per-
ceived value of production vs. safety) that coordinate
on safety (e.g., aviation, energy) have been identified
as contributing to organizational mishaps.(24,26)
Second, safety-critical work is often performed
by multicultural and co-located teams,(27) which,
while being potentially valuable (e.g., for bringing
together different perspectives on safety), also
presents challenges for safety management.(25,28)
For example, where national cultural traits (e.g., for
challenging authority) influence the safety-related
beliefs of team members (e.g., on the acceptability
of highlighting a supervisor’s mistake), coordination
on safety activities may not be optimal (e.g., expec-
tations and behaviors for speaking up).(27,29,30) Third,
globalized industries and organizations operate in
different regulatory environments, and must perform
to different standards for managing and learning
from risk.(31,32) This means a single organization can
be required to work to different safety standards
depending on the location of operations, which
potentially creates confusion (e.g., where safety
protocols differ according to national location) and
regulatory environments that are weaker than others
(e.g., on inspection routines).(33)
Thus, improving the current understanding of
safety management in international industries and
environments is a priority, with the safety research
literature indicating that variations in national safety
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practices influence safety outcomes. For example,
Spangenberg et al.(34) reported, on a joint-venture
construction project, Danish workers to have four
times the lost-time injury rates of Swedish workers.
Differences were partly explained by safety legis-
lation (macro-factors), job stability (meso-factors),
and safety training and attitudes (micro-factors).
Similarly, variations in accident rates among multi-
cultural groups of seafarers (e.g., Chinese, Philippine,
Taiwanese) have been explained by differences in
national culture.(35) In aviation, national cul-
ture differences have been associated with flight
incidents,(36) and variations in the occurrence
of medical error have been explained by national
differences in safety procedures and management.(37)
Research examining associations between safety
and national culture often utilize Hofstede’s(22) na-
tional culture paradigm. This assumes individuals
from a nation to share some core values with fel-
low citizens, with five key dimensions being re-
ported (power distance, collectivism, uncertainty
avoidance, masculinity, long-term orientation).(38,39)
While the notion of national culture being homoge-
nous, measurable (and distinguishable between so-
cieties), and associated with practice is heavily cri-
tiqued (e.g., from a constructivist and symbolic inter-
actionist perspective),(40) good psychometric prop-
erties of national trait measurement have been
demonstrated,(41,42) and it has been argued that
measures of national culture are not absolute and
are instead indicative of general tendencies within
populations.(43) For example, it is recognized that
where cultures encourage individualism, homogene-
ity of national culture is arguably less likely.(44)
In particular, the observation that differences
in national culture account for variations in or-
ganizational culture within organizations operating
in multiple countries is relevant for safety culture
research.(38) Examining whether safety culture is also
shaped by national cultural tendencies appears im-
portant for interpreting safety-related practices and
beliefs in different national contexts. Specifically, the
dimensions of power distance (i.e., valuing social and
institutional hierarchies), individualism/collectivism
(i.e., seeing oneself as independent or closely re-
lated to others), and uncertainty avoidance (i.e., feel-
ing uncomfortable with novel/ambiguous situations)
have been identified as relevant for safety culture.(45)
They have been associated with safety failures in
the shipping industry,(35) aviation incidents,(36) avia-
tion safety behaviors (e.g., following orders, adhering
to protocols, situational flexibility),(45,46) and human
factors accident analyses.(47) We consider this litera-
ture further in the section below.
2.2. Cross-Cultural Investigations of Safety Culture
Despite growing interest in the topic, relatively
little research has examined associations between
national culture and safety culture. Cross-cultural
studies of safety in the energy industry have shown
that risk-taking behaviors are simultaneously influ-
enced by national culture and beliefs onmanagement
commitment to safety.(24) Health-care research has
shown that, alongside interorganizational differ-
ences in safety culture, cross-cultural variations in
safety culture are potentially explained by national
differences (e.g., in the United States, Thailand,
and the Netherlands).(48) Yet, the relationship be-
tween safety culture and national culture has not
been systematically examined, and to do this it is
necessary to develop measurement models of safety
culture that function reliably in different cultural
environments, and to associate these with metrics
of national culture. Yet, this is problematic for the
following reasons.
First, safety culture models previously demon-
strated to work through questionnaires in Western
settings have been shown (when tested through
confirmatory factor analysis) to function poorly
in other (e.g., Asian) cultural environments.(49)
Explanatory reasons include the lack of relevance of
safety culture questionnaire dimensions to the local
environment, and cultural differences in national
response patterns. This indicates that generic safety
culture models cannot automatically be applied from
one cultural setting to another, and may require sub-
stantial customization (e.g., to a particular industry).
Second, participants from different cultural
backgrounds (e.g., Hispanic and white non-Hispanic)
have been shown to respond differently to la-
tent safety culture questionnaire dimensions (in the
same organization).(50) This means that the construct
equivalence of item meanings cannot be assumed
between participants from different cultural back-
grounds, and that data may vary due to differences in
response styles and interpretations of safety culture
dimensions.
Third, the relationship between safety culture
variables can differ in culturally diverse environ-
ments. This means that predictive models developed
to explain safety culture (and its relationship with
safety) in one setting may not hold in another.(51)
It indicates a need for either culturally distinct
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predictive models of safety culture, or the develop-
ment of models designed from the outset to function
in cross-cultural environments.
Thus, to effectively measure and examine safety
culture in cross-cultural environments, measurement
equivalence is required to address these issues. Fur-
thermore, to examine how safety culture is associated
with national culture (e.g., to explain national vari-
ations in safety culture), it is necessary to associate
metrics of the two.
3. THE CURRENT STUDY
In the current study, we examine the psychome-
tric properties of a questionnaire designed to assess
safety culture in different cultural environments
(i.e., nations, regions), and then examine whether
national variations in safety culture are associated
with national culture.
To do this, we investigate safety culture within
the field of air traffic management (ATM) in 17
European countries. ATM is one of the safest
components of the highly reliable civil aviation
industry.(52,53) In Europe, national air navigation ser-
vice providers (ANSPs) operate in a single inter-
connected industry, and ANSP staff are primarily
nationals of the host country, with practices being
influenced by both European-wide standards and
organizational characteristics (e.g., traffic demand,
resources, team structures).(54) However, because
ATM performance is prefaced upon having a reliable
and safe system, when mishaps do occur (e.g., the
U¨berlingen mid-air collision in 2002, which resulted
in 71 fatalities) they are catastrophic.(55) Stability is
essential for ATM, with safety being shaped by a
wide range of constructs (e.g., incident reporting,
learning from near-events, resource management,
safety communication, collaboration), and thus
safety culture appears useful for investigating ANSP
safety practices (in comparison to safety climate,
which is a more dynamic and narrow construct).(12)
Adopting an international perspective on safety cul-
ture would allow for an examination of how safety
practices are influenced by national cultural fac-
tors (e.g., with possible implications for activities
within and between ANSPs), and aid in understand-
ing how gradual change within ATM (e.g., automa-
tion, commercialization, increased integration be-
tween ANSPs) might shape safety management.
3.1. Measuring Safety Culture in Different
Cultural Environments
The first aim of this study is to test the psy-
chometric properties of a safety culture question-
naire tool developed for European ATM. The survey
items underlying the tool were developed through
literature review and qualitative investigations (in-
terviews, focus groups, incident analyses). The ques-
tionnaire is part of a broader toolkit developed for
understanding and improving safety culture in ATM,
and its purpose is to measure staff (e.g., operational,
management) assessments and beliefs on safety cul-
ture within their ANSP. Data from the survey are
used to structure qualitative investigations of safety
culture (e.g., workshops with groups of operational,
engineering, and management staff to identify and
understand specific safety problems), and to study
safety culture longitudinally. A prototype version of
the questionnaire was tested in four ANSPs in 2008,
and a preliminary safety culture model was partially
supported.(56) Further refinement was required, with
the final model identifying six dimensions of safety
culture relevant to ATM across Europe. These are
outlined in Table I, and the study method.
To test the ATM safety culture model, we exam-
ine whether it operates reliably across 17 countries in
four European regions. These four regions are sig-
nificant because cross-cultural research often clus-
ters groups of people according to commonality.(57)
Clusters are based on geographic proximity, mass
migrations, religious and linguistic characteristics,
sociopolitical and economic development, and atti-
tudes, values, and work goals.(58) Within Europe,
four macro-geographic clusters are outlined by the
United Nations,(59) with their cultural differences
and similarities documented:(60–63) Northern Europe
(e.g., Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom),
Eastern Europe (e.g., former Eastern Bloc nations),
Southern Europe (e.g., Mediterranean nations), and
Western Europe (e.g., France, Germany, Benelux).
For safety culture in European ATM, regional
clusters are important for understanding how nations
compare against neighboring countries with similar
cultural profiles. In particular, if safety culture is in-
fluenced by national culture, it may be useful to com-
pare safety culture scores within groups of similar
neighboring countries in order to account for medi-
ating and potentially confounding relationships. This
could facilitate organizational learning and the shar-
ing of good practice at a regional level. The U.N.
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clusters provide an initial and pragmatic place to be-
gin testing an international safety culture model.
We first hypothesize that the safety culture
model (described in Table I) will operate reli-
ably for operational staff and management across
the four European clusters, indicating equivalence
of constructs, measurement, and causal relations
(hypothesis 1a), and support for the initial use of the
four U.N. regions to cluster national ANSPs (hypoth-
esis 1b). We expect to find this due to the bottom-
up development of the safety culture questionnaire,
which examines concepts that are critical to safety
culture in all ANSPs (e.g., incident reporting prac-
tices), and was developed (i.e., items and dimen-
sions) through an iterative process of interviews, ob-
servations, incident reports, and systematic literature
review.(56,64)
To further examine the equivalence of responses
to the safety culture questionnaire, it is necessary to
test for the presence of acquiescent response styles,
whereby individuals provide socially desirable an-
swers and avoid negative extremities.(65) In short,
high power distance, collectivism, and uncertainty
avoidance can result in unwillingness to critique or
disagree with the superiors or established state of
affairs, presenting a potential confound in eliciting
negative responses on safety culture questionnaires.
Thus, in regions where these traits are highest, we
expect to find a larger acquiescence response bias
(hypothesis 1c).
3.2. Associations Between Safety Culture and
National Culture
We also investigate whether variations in safety
culture (at both the European-country and regional
level) are associated with national cultural traits. We
examine the relationship between individual country
data on safety culture and independent data on Hof-
stede’s national culture dimensions. To do this, we
focus on country-level (and independent) national
culture data to avoid common method bias. In par-
ticular, questionnaire measures of safety culture and
national culture have notable similarities (e.g., beliefs
on speaking up to authority), and to rigorously ex-
amine the association between safety culture and na-
tional culture, independence between measures is re-
quired.
Research investigating national culture within
Europe indicates that while individual countries
vary considerably in terms of norms and be-
lief structures,(22,66) countries within a region (e.g.,
Northern Europe) tend to be reasonably similar.(67)
We examine whether this is also the case for safety
culture, and the relationship between safety culture
and national culture. Short definitions of the dimen-
sions described by Hofstede, their potential associ-
ations with safety management in ATM, and their
variations in Europe are reported in Table II.
3.2.1. Examining Associations Between Safety
Culture and National Culture
We initially consider the country-level relation-
ship between safety culture and national culture. In
terms of hypotheses, and using national norm data
on Hofstede’s dimensions,(22) we draw on the cross-
culture and safety culture literatures to make a num-
ber of predictions on the relationship between these
data and safety culture in European ANSPs.
First, we predict that safety culture will have
a negative relationship with national norms on col-
lectivism (hypothesis 2a). Soeters and Boer(36) indi-
cate that low collectivism (i) reduces fear of endan-
gering the harmony of relationships (e.g., through
identifying problems), (ii) increases explicit commu-
nication behaviors, (iii) reduces embarrassment for
making an error (increasing voluntary reporting),
and (iv) decreases career-defensive behaviors (e.g.,
speaking up to authority). Furthermore, high col-
lectivism, through emphasizing in-group harmony,
can reduce willingness to critique or break group
norms.(63) Thus, collectivism might be expected to be
negatively associated with safety culture.
Second, we predict that safety culture will have
a negative relationship with national norms on
power distance (hypothesis 2b). High power dis-
tances are identified as influencing safety through
(i) discouraging the correction of errors by supe-
riors, (ii) placing primacy of communication and
debate on a superior,(36) (iii) generating unwilling-
ness to challenge authority, and (iv) creating asym-
metrical communication between management and
subordinates.(24) Conversely, low power distances fa-
cilitate open discussion of safety issues and proactive
safety actions.(68)
Third, we predict that safety culture will have a
negative relationship with national norms on uncer-
tainty avoidance (hypothesis 2c). Uncertainty avoid-
ance is indicated to aversely influence safety by (i)
placing a greater reliance on technical solutions,(69)
(ii) restricting innovation, (iii) defining more rigid
rules and regulations, which (iv) make people more
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reliant on procedures that cannot prescribe all sce-
narios or when breaking rules is in the interest
of safety.(70) This creates an overreliance on es-
tablished practice and limits adaptive improvisation
in normal and emergency situations. Uncertainty
avoidance may also shape willingness to engage in
behaviors that have threatening consequences (e.g.,
admitting an error, critiquing management on
safety). Conversely, low uncertainty avoidance pro-
motes flexibility, innovation on safety, and a willing-
ness to engage in safety-related behaviors that have
socially ambiguous outcomes.
Fourth, we predict that safety culture will have
a negative relationship with national norms on
masculinity (hypothesis 2d). Although the relation-
ship between safety culture and masculinity has
not generally been discussed, tentative hypotheses
can be proposed. High masculinity might influence
safety aversely by supporting competitive and target-
focused behaviors that obstruct collaboration.(24)
Conversely, low masculinity favors solidarity, con-
sensus, and promotes collaboration.
Fifth, we predict that safety culture will have
a negative relationship with national norms on
short-term orientation (hypothesis 2e). As with mas-
culinity, the relationship between safety culture and
short-term orientation is relatively little discussed
within the safety culture literature. Short-term ori-
entation may impact negatively upon safety culture
as it leads to (i) pressure on employees to focus on
immediate gains, (ii) less planning and perseverance
to attain long-term goals (e.g., a good safety record),
and (iii) less awareness of safety culture from a holis-
tic systems perspective. A short-term orientation
may therefore lead to a focus on immediate safety
challenges instead of on-going safety improvements.
3.2.2. Examining Regional Differences in
Safety Culture
Having examined the relationship between
safety culture and national culture at a country
level, we extend our investigations to the European
regional level. Interpretations of national data on
safety culture may be better served if they are
situated within a culturally relevant context. In
particular, for each dimension of national culture,
notable differences exist between the four Euro-
pean regions.(22) These are reported in Table II.
The cross-cultural psychology literature highlights
a range of factors that explain these differences.
These factors include the valuing of intellectual
self-expressiveness(60,63) and innovation(69) in North-
ern Europe, societal preferences for workplace egal-
itarianism in Western Europe,(60,61) and organiza-
tional preferences for authoritarian leadership(62,71)
and reduced interpersonal directness(61) in Southern
Europe and Eastern Europe.
In summary, regional differences in national cul-
ture at the European level are as follows. For Hofst-
ede’s dimensions of collectivism, power distance, and
uncertainty avoidance (the three dimensions primar-
ily associated with safety), the lowest scores are typ-
ically reported by countries in (1) Northern Europe,
(2) Western Europe and Eastern Europe (alternat-
ing), and (3) Southern Europe (see Table II).
In terms of the hypotheses, we expect that safety
culture data will follow a similar pattern of results,
with responses being significantly different between
regions, and the most positive scores being reported
by (1) Northern Europe, then (2) Western Europe
and Eastern Europe, and (3) Southern Europe. We
test this for the six safety culture dimensions of:
management commitment to safety (hypothesis 3a);
incident reporting (hypothesis 3b); communication
(hypothesis 3c); collaborating for safety (hypothesis
3d); colleague commitment to safety (hypothesis 3e);
and safety support (hypothesis 3f).
4. METHOD
4.1. Participants
The data were collected through a pan-European
project for exploring ATM safety culture. In collab-
oration with EUROCONTROL (the ATM network
manager for Europe), a methodology for investigat-
ing and improving safety culture was developed. The
purpose was to aid ANSPs in identifying strengths
and areas for development in safety management, to
assess differences in safety culture between ANSPs,
and to help ANSPs manage change in the ATM in-
dustry. Over a six-year period, 27 ANSPs have par-
ticipated in the project (with access facilitated by
EUROCONTROL).
For the current study, we report on recent
safety culture questionnaires completed by staff
in 17 ANSPs during the period 2011–2013. They
were selected from the following European regions:
Northern Europe (four countries), Western Europe
(four countries), Eastern Europe (four countries),
and Southern Europe (five countries). For reasons
of anonymity and political sensitivity, the identities
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Fig. 1. Map of Europe showing the regions and 27 countries that have participated in the safety culture study up to April 2013 (countries
that have used alternative surveys are presented as not surveyed).
of individual countries are not reported.4 However, a
map of all countries that have participated in the sur-
vey (since 2008) is reported in Fig. 1. All countries
were given the opportunity to participate, but each
chose to participate at a time that suited internal con-
straints (e.g., availability of staff, other surveys, and
research).
In total, 10,717 members of staff responded, with
an average response rate of 61% (see Table III). The
mean size of the ANSPs was 1,191, while the range
was 177 to 2,116. Of all participants, 5,176 (48.3%)
had an operational role (i.e., air traffic controller,
4The data collected within this study are highly sensitive for in-
dividual ANSPs, and for reasons of anonymity, we cannot spec-
ify the country locations. This is because the identification of a
“nonoptimal” safety culture score can bring public and politi-
cal pressure onto an ANSP (or any organization) to improve.
Yet, conversely, such pressure can actually weaken safety culture
through organizations feeling the need to (i) disguise safety prob-
lems (to avoid further embarrassment), and (ii) encourage “gam-
ing” of safety culture (e.g., through staff being encouraged to re-
spond positively to surveys) in order to achieve a “target” rather
than a genuine improvement in safety culture.
operational supervisor, aeronautical information ser-
vices [AIS] specialist), and 1,230 (11.5%) had a man-
agerial role. Demographic data on gender and age
were not collected to ensure the anonymity of indi-
viduals and minority groups. To adjust for sampling
differences across regions and occupational groups,
weights were applied proportionally.
4.2. Procedure
Questionnaires were administered electronically
in 10 ANSPs (4,405 operational staff and 1,095 man-
agement staff, average 57% response rate); however,
seven smaller ANSPS preferred a pen-and-paper
method (711 operational staff and 135 management
staff, average 67% response rate). No significant dif-
ferences were found in the responses using different
data-collection methods. ANSPs chose one format
or the other for practical reasons (e.g., staff access
to computers). In the case of paper questionnaires,
ANSP safety management staff distributed the ques-
tionnaire (paper or electronic link), following onsite
10 Reader et al.
Table III. Participant Response Rate for 17 ANSPs
Operational Staff Management Staff
ANSP Year N % of Survey Sample N % of Survey Sample Overall Response Rate (%)
NE-1 2013 379 71% 42 8% 66%
NE-2 2013 231 50% 72 15% 69%
NE-3 2012 252 53% 46 10% 46%
NE-4 2012 86 49% 30 17% 70%
EE-1 2011 91 28% 21 6% 69%
EE-2 2011 105 59% 13 7% 22%
EE-3 2011 319 45% 41 6% 98%
EE-4 2013 83 42% 22 11% 63%
SE-1 2013 172 34% 58 12% 52%
SE-2 2011 47 57% 11 9% 92%
SE-3 2012 1,258 61% 128 6% 50%
SE-4 2012 311 60% 29 6% 78%
SE-5 2013 128 67% 9 5% 70%
WE-1 2012 904 43% 244 12% 36%
WE-2 2011 48 39% 9 7% 77%
WE-3 2012 226 58% 39 10% 57%
WE-4 2011 536 33% 416 26% 23%
Total 5,176 47% 1,230 11% 61%
promotion activities by both EUROCONTROL and
ANSP safety management personnel. Due to shift
rotations, questionnaires were available for comple-
tion for a period of four weeks. For practical rea-
sons, questionnaires could be completed at work or
home (poststudy feedback indicated most to be com-
pleted at work). The questionnaires were part of
a mixed-methods investigation of safety culture at
each ANSP, described previously,(56) with the results
from the survey disseminated and discussed in work-
shops and interviews with staff from all backgrounds.
Based on these workshops, a set of safety recommen-
dations were developed.
4.3. Measures
The safety culture questionnaire scale was de-
veloped through theoretical analysis, interviews, and
workshops with European ANSP staff, discussions
with safety managers, pilot testing, experience re-
views, and exploratory and confirmatory factor anal-
ysis (CFA).(56,64) The questionnaire is designed to
reflect safety culture issues specific to ATM, to
be understandable in all study locations, and uses
well-established safety culture themes (e.g., manage-
ment commitment to safety, incident reporting, and
communication).(12) It was developed through pilot
testing of a 36-item (six-dimension) scale, of which
an earlier CFA showed a limited subset of items to
operate reliably.(56) Further adaptations were made
to develop the six-dimension model (see Table I)
outlined in this article (i.e., removing items that did
not operate reliably). The dimensions are: “Manage-
ment commitment to safety” (three items), “Collab-
orating for safety” (four items), “Incident report-
ing” (three items), “Communication” (four items),
“Colleague commitment to safety” (three items), and
“Safety Support” (two items). Questionnaires were
translated and back-translated (or partially trans-
lated, depending on the usage of English with the
ANSPs) into the national language(s) of the ANSPs.
4.4. Analysis
To test the cross-cultural and cross-occupational
measurement equivalence of the safety culture
model (hypotheses 1a–1b), a multigroup confirma-
tory factor analysis (MGCFA) was performed on the
eight groups (2: occupation× 4: region) using AMOS
19 (Amost Development Corp., Crawfordville, FL,
USA). The steps taken followed Chen et al.’s(72)
outline for second-order models, and the measure-
ment equivalence literature.(50,72–74) After testing the
model independently in each of the groups (step 0),
measurement equivalence is tested through nine con-
secutive steps (summarized in Table IV) in order
to establish the extent of measurement equivalence
of the model. Goodness of fit was indicated by the
An International Safety Culture Model 11
Table IV. Model Specification and Interpretation
Model Model Interpretation
0 Separate tests for each group The model holds in each group independently
1 Configural model, no constraints (bar identification) The model holds across groups
2 First-order factor loadings invariant First-order dimensions relate similarly to items across groups
3 First- and second-order factor loadings invariant Second-order dimensions relate similarly to first-order dimensions across groups
4 First-order intercepts invariant Groups have similar means on itemsa
5 First- and second-order intercepts invariant Groups have similar latent meansa
6 Covariance constrained Second-order dimensions are equally correlated across groups
7 Factor variances constrained Equal factor variances across groups
8 Residual errors constrained Groups have equal residual errors
9 Measurement variances constrained Groups have equal measurement errors
aDue to model’s identification constrains put on the latent means these are similar in interpretation.
RMSEA (<0.08 a moderate fit; <0.06 a good fit)
and CFI (0.90). Model comparison was based on
CFI (a more pragmatic approach than comparison
of the chi-square(75)). The cut-off for a decrease in
model fit was placed at CFI < 0.01. To treat miss-
ing values, means and intercepts were estimated by
AMOS 19 following full information maximum like-
lihood (FIML) estimation. As this procedure speci-
fies a means structure, GFI and RMR fit indices were
undefined and not calculated.(76)
To test for acquiescence effects (hypothesis 1c),
acquiescence was measured by calculating the bal-
ance between having an acquiescent response style
(i.e., agree/strongly agree) and a nonacquiescent
response style.(65) Taking into account reversed
items, the number of nonacquiescent responses
was subtracted from the number of acquiescent
responses and divided by the total number of items
in the model. The acquiescence balance was taken
up as a covariate and set to zero to eliminate the
influence of the response style (the formula used
was: acquiescence balance = (nagree, strongly agree –
ndisagree, strongly disagree)/ nitems).
Subsequently, missing data were imputed fol-
lowing SPSS 21’s estimation maximization (EM)
procedure.(76) EM produces unbiased estimates
when data are missing at random and is preferable
over list- and pair-wise deletion.
Associations between safety culture and Hof-
stede’s dimensions (hypotheses 2a–2e) were tested
using Pearson correlations based on country scores
and regional aggregates of scores. All European
countries in Hofstede’s work(22) were identified and
ordered into the four European regions. Regional
scores were calculated by averaging the country
scores.
A Multivariate ANalysis Of VAriance
(MANOVA) was performed using SPSS 21 (SPSS,
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA) to test cross-regional effects
on the dimensions of the model (hypotheses 3a–3f).
A MANOVA is a statistical test procedure for com-
paring multivariate (population) means of several
groups. Though a significance level of p  0.05 was
used, effect sizes were given interpretative weight
due to the large sample and increased possibility of
statistical significance (small  0.01; medium  0.06;
large  0.14).(77)
5. RESULTS
5.1. Descriptive Data
For the study dimensions, means and standard
deviation scores were calculated for each country, re-
gion, and occupational group. These are reported in
Table V.
5.2. Multigroup Confirmatory Factor Analysis
(Hypotheses 1a–1b)
The MGCFA tested hypotheses 1a–1b (that a
reliable model for measuring safety culture would
be found) through establishing the cross-cultural
equivalence of the factor model (see Table VI).
Independent tests (model 0) showed moderate to
good fit for operational and management staff across
Europe (CFIs 0.884–0.936; RMSEAs 0.061–0.074).
The results indicated that the model had a possi-
ble weaker fit for Western European operational
staff (CFI 0.884; RMSEA 0.069 [0.066–0.073]). The
model, however, held consistently across groups as
the configural model (model 1) had a good fit (CFI
12 Reader et al.
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88 0.918; RMSEA 0.024 [0.023–0.024]). This established
model validity across regions and occupations (hy-
potheses 1a–1b).
Consecutive steps indicated that across the eight
groups relations were equal among items and first-
order dimensions (model 2), and between first- and
second-order dimensions (model 3). Constraining
first- and second-order factor loadings did not result
in a significantly worse fit (i.e., CFI = –0.011 and
–0.008). Constraining first-order intercepts across all
groups (model 4), however, resulted in a significantly
worse fit (i.e., CFI = –0.152). This was likely ex-
plained by variation among operational staff as the
partial intercept invariance model (model 4a) con-
straining only managers across Europe resulted in
a borderline decrease of fit (i.e., CFI = –0.015).
Model 5 had no significant additional meaning due to
model identification constraints and therefore model
4a indicated possible latent mean differences among
operational staff, but not management staff.
Taking this partial first-order intercept invari-
ance into account, the final steps (models 6 to 9) indi-
cated that constraining covariances (CFI= –0.007),
factor variances (CFI = –0.010), and residual er-
rors (CFI = –0.013) did not result in a significantly
worse fit. Measurement error invariance could, how-
ever, not be established as it resulted in a significantly
worse fit (CFI = –0.091). Although beyond step 3
CFIs dropped below 0.90, the RMSEAs indicate a
good fit. These results are summarized in Table VI,
and support hypotheses 1a and 1b. Additionally, step
4a indicated that regional differences between man-
agers and operational staff may exist in safety culture
scores.
5.2.1. Acquiescence Effects (Hypothesis 1c)
Results suggested that responses across regions
may have been influenced by an acquiescence effect
F(3,6465) = 725.07, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.252. Yet this
was present for every region, and thus no support was
found for hypothesis 1c.
5.3. Associations Between Safety Culture and
Hofstede’s Dimensions (Hypotheses 2a–2e)
Safety culture dimensions were expected to have
a negative relationship with collectivism, power dis-
tance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and short-
term orientation. Pearson’s correlations indicated
that Hofstede’s country-level national cultural traits
had small to moderate and negative associations with
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all safety culture dimensions (confirming hypotheses
2a–2e).
At the regional level, these effects were in
the same direction as at the country level, but the
correlations were slightly stronger for most safety
culture dimensions’ associations with collectivism,
except for colleague commitment to safety. Regional
effects of power distance, uncertainty avoidance,
short-term orientation, and masculinity were roughly
similar to country-level effects. The correlations are
summarized in Table VII.
5.4. Multigroup Analysis of Variance
(Hypotheses 3a–3f)
To test for a main effect of European regions,
a MANOVA with Bonferroni post hoc analysis was
conducted. Mean scores and standard deviations are
presented in Table V. An initial 2 (occupational
group) by 4 (European regions) MANOVA indi-
cated that European regions differed moderately to
largely on the safety culture dimensions, F(3,6399)s
 155.41, ps < 0.001, η2s between 0.067 and 0.234.
5.4.1. Post Hoc Analysis of Regional Differences
It was predicted that differences in safety cul-
ture would reflect regional norms for Hofstede’s
dimensions (hypotheses 3a–3e), with (1) Northern
Europe most positive, and then (2) Western Europe
and Eastern Europe (alternating), and (3) Southern
Europe. Post hoc ANOVAs (Bonferroni) on the dif-
ferences between regional means indicated that Eu-
ropean regions scored significantly differently from
each other on the safety culture dimensions. To sum-
marize, the pattern was that (1) Northern Europe
scored most favorably, followed by (2) Eastern and
Western Europe, with (3) Southern Europe having
the least favorable scores. The relative position of
Eastern and Western Europe varied, with mean dif-
ferences between these two regions being absent or
smaller than for other regions (MDs  0.25, ps be-
tween ns and 0.001). But they consistently scored
between Northern and Southern Europe. This was
the case formanagement commitment to safety (MDs
 0.43, ps < 0.001; supporting hypothesis 3a), in-
cident reporting (MDs  0.47, ps  0.001; support-
ing hypothesis 3b), communication (MDs  0.54,
ps < 0.001, supporting hypothesis 3c), collaborating
for safety (MDs  0.42, ps < 0.001; supporting hy-
pothesis 3d), and safety support (MDs  0.38, ps <
0.001; supporting hypothesis 3f). Yet, for colleague
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Fig. 2. Cross-regional differences for operational staff (straight line) and management (dashed line).
commitment to safety this trend was not observed,
and hypothesis 3e was not supported.
5.4.2. Additional Observations
Finally, further inspection of the MANOVAs
found managers to perceive safety culture more
positively than operational staff across Europe:
F(1,6399)s  129.22, ps < 0.001, η2s between 0.019
and 0.117, except colleague commitment to safety,
F(1,6399) = 11.85, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.002. Inspec-
tion of effect sizes indicated that differences between
operational and management staff on perceptions
of safety culture were larger within some regions
(e.g., Southern Europe: F(1,6399)s  512.33, ps <
0.001; η2s between 0.074 and 0.168) than others (e.g.,
Eastern Europe: F(1,6399)s  56.29, ps  0.001,
η2s between 0.009 and 0.013). Differences were ab-
sent or negligible for Northern Europe, F(1,6399)s
 0.87, ps < 0.350, η2s  0.004, colleague commit-
ment to safety within each region, safety support in
Eastern and Western Europe, and incident reporting
and communication for Western Europe. Fig. 2 illus-
trates the differences in group perceptions of safety
culture.
6. DISCUSSION
A number of notable findings can be highlighted
from the current investigation. First, we established
the psychometric properties of a safety culture ques-
tionnaire for ATM across four European regions
(outlined by the United Nations), with psychome-
tric equivalence being established for the safety
culture model. To our knowledge, this is the first
time it has been demonstrated that safety culture can
be reliably measured and investigated in different
cultural contexts.
Second, we found safety culture to be associated
with national norms on Hofstede’s five dimensions of
national culture. In addition, the rank-order of Eu-
ropean regions on the safety culture dimensions was
generally predicted by regional cultural norms, ex-
cept for colleague commitment to safety. These find-
ings have not been demonstrated before, and they
underline a potential relationship between national
cultural tendencies and safety culture, with consider-
able implications for how safety culture is conceptu-
alized and understood.
Third, managers were observed to assess safety
culture more positively than operational staff.
This is consistent with the research literature.(24,78)
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However, differences between operational and
management staff were larger for some regions (e.g.,
Southern and Eastern Europe) than others (e.g.,
Northern Europe). This may reflect differences in
how operational and management staff communicate
on safety (e.g., for sharing employee concerns, or for
discussing management commitment to safety),(79)
with such practices potentially shaped by national
culture (e.g., power distance). Understanding these
differences will be the focus of future research.
Finally, although the study hypotheses were sup-
ported, several anomalous findings emerged. In par-
ticular, national culture did not interact consistently
with the dimension of colleague commitment to
safety, and this may be due to this dimension refer-
ring primarily to group practices rather than organi-
zational norms.
6.1. Theoretical Implications
The study results raise a number of theoretical
considerations. For the first time, a safety culture
model that is reliable and functionally equivalent in
different cultural environments has been established.
This indicates that safety culture can be investigated
and measured in a range of cross-cultural environ-
ments, yet in doing so, associations between national
culture and safety culture must be considered.
In particular, we found safety culture to be
associated with characteristics of national culture.
Although not causal, the associations are hypothe-
sized to occur because a high power distance culture
may reduce the openness of communication on
safety (e.g., placing primacy on communication from
superiors, generating unwillingness to challenge
authority), and a collectivist culture may create
tendencies to maintain group harmony (e.g., through
not challenging unsafe group activity). High uncer-
tainty avoidance cultures may create an overreliance
on established practice that limits innovation and
flexibility. Masculinity and short-term orientation
may create a focus on competition and immediate
gains over long-term interests. The findings are
consistent with work showing cultural differences to
influence how risks are perceived and accepted,(28,80)
and there is a need to understand how other national
factors (e.g., regulation, training) might shape safety
culture,(81) alongside factors such as language and
communication methods.(82)
In terms of safety culture theory, the study
indicates the need to consider how safety culture
is embedded within societal practices. This further
distinguishes safety culture from safety climate,
and emphasizes the importance of considering the
emergent and shared nature of safety culture(83)
in whichever context it is studied. Douglas(84) and
other authors,(3,8,86-88) have argued that cultures
of risk are inherently social and political, and be-
cause definitions of safety are often ambiguous
and socially constructed (e.g., by management or
government(89–91)), institutions develop safety norms
and taboos that are constructed around group
boundaries, identity, and conflicts of interest.(3,84,92)
For safety climate, however, there are also im-
plications. In particular, given the conceptual and
methodological overlap with safety culture, it is likely
that safety climate can also be measured reliably in
different national environments. Furthermore, the
strong association between “management commit-
ment” and “long-term orientation” scales indicates
a potential relationship between societal tendencies
and safety climate for short-term goals (i.e., pro-
duction vs. safety). Finally, acknowledging research
demonstrating the importance of supervisors in shap-
ing safety climate in work units,(12) future research
may examine whether supervisors moderate the rela-
tionship between national culture and safety climate.
The findings of the current study indicate that
considering issues such as power, social construction-
ism, and national worldviews(93) is necessary if safety
culture research is to go beyond methodological
individualism and become truly cultural. However,
some caution is also required. The aim of the current
study is not to identify whether some national
cultures produce “safer organizations.” Rather, it is
to understand how national culture might influence
safety culture, and how this knowledge can be used
to better understand safety-related practices. For
example, where national culture shapes behavioral
tendencies (e.g., avoiding face-threatening acts(94))
and thus safety (e.g., highlighting supervisor error),
interventions to enhance safety will need to reflect
the cultural context (i.e., in training, protocols,
management engagement with staff). Furthermore,
where safety culture scores are lower, this does not
necessarily indicate ATM to be unsafe, as what is
considered “good” or “poor” is partially contextual.
Our future investigations will focus on how, and
whether, it is really possible to “benchmark” safety
culture data from one country against another.
Finally, as ATM is a global industry, it is nec-
essary to examine whether the safety culture model
is generalizable beyond Europe (e.g., the United
States, Asia), and whether the associations between
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national culture and safety culture are also present.
Furthermore, to improve our understanding of
how organizations might influence the relationship
between national culture and safety culture, future
research may wish to examine international safety
culture in a single organization (e.g., an airline) that
operates globally, yet is managed centrally from one
nation (unlike ATM, where each country has its own
ANSP).
6.2. Practical Implications
In terms of practical implications, the study has
implications for the ATM industry, and also other
high-risk industries.
Through developing a model of safety culture
that is reliable and functionally equivalent for dif-
ferent national environments, comparisons of ATM
safety culture in different countries can be under-
taken. This might be useful for identifying problems
in safety management, recognizing good practice,
and for facilitating learning on safety at a global-
level.(95) Such insight would be useful for identifying
safety problems across an international system, and
for targeting resources and know-how. However,
in performing comparisons of safety culture from
different countries, interpretation of data and trends
will be enhanced through considering the normative
cultural properties of countries and regions. For
example, through qualitative examination of the
survey data (e.g., in workshops), context-specific
enablers and barriers to safety culture can be iden-
tified. In the current study, post-survey workshops
shed light on participant response patterns, and
allowed discussion of cultural-relevant stories and
scenarios to help understand safety culture (e.g.,
relating to high power distance). This can support
the development of interventions (e.g., focusing on
listening and communication skills for management)
that are relevant for sharing among peer countries.
Also important is the observation that opera-
tional and management staff differ in perceptions of
safety culture, with differences potentially indicating
mismatching expectations or awareness of safety
practices. Such observations lend themselves to
practical steps, with clear communication on risk
(e.g., incident reporting, change, safety threats)
being important for avoiding confusion on safety-
related practices, and promoting trust in manager
and colleague commitment to safety. The role of na-
tional culture as an influencer of risk communication
between managers and operational staff is unclear,
yet appears important for practice (i.e., for iden-
tifying effective modes of communication). While
sociocultural theories are well established within the
risk communication literature,(93) investigations of
risk communications in international industries are
few,(96) and we encourage future research.
In relation to the aviation industry more broadly,
safety culture assessment might be better integrated
into measures of performance in the ATM industry,
which primarily focuses on traffic management and
cost efficiency. However, to do this it is necessary
to identify thresholds whereby safety culture scores
are considered poor or good, and protocols for
taking action where safety culture is found to be
suboptimal (i.e., actively using safety culture as a
leading indicator of safety performance). Also, the
model developed here might be extended more
broadly to measure safety culture across the avia-
tion industry (e.g., airlines, manufacturers), and to
develop an integrated domain approach to safety
culture measurement in aviation.
6.3. Limitations
Several limitations require discussion. This study
primarily relied on cross-sectional data to assess
safety culture, yet holistic safety culture assess-
ment includes both quantitative and qualitative
research.(18) The safety culture model was devel-
oped through a bottom-up process, which is both a
strength (i.e., it is tailored to ATM) and a weakness
(i.e., it cannot be compared with previous models).
The extent to which more generic (i.e., non-industry
tailored) measures of safety culture can function
cross-culturally is unclear. The research did not col-
lect safety outcome data, and did not link national
and safety culture to safety performance. Further-
more, of the safety culture scales themselves, the
“safety support” scale only consisted of two items,
and its face validity is not ideal.
The utilization of Hofstede’s national culture
dimensions to conceptualize and measure national
culture is debatable,(40) as was the use of theoret-
ically derived (rather than data-driven) national
cultural clusters.(58,67) Concerns relate to the simpli-
fication of highly complex cultures, the metrication
of national culture, cultural relativism, and utilizing
national data to explore micro-level problems. We
did not sample participants using Hofstede’s national
culture measures to avoid common method bias, but
the national norm data may not reflect the sample
used in this study. Finally, local constraints meant
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data collection involved two methods (electronic and
paper), with a marginal difference in response rates
being observed.
6.4. Conclusion
We have demonstrated that industry-tailored
safety culture models can operate reliably across
national boundaries and occupational groups. This
indicates that safety culture can be measured and
compared in different countries, with implications for
research and practice. Furthermore, we have shown
safety culture to be associated with national culture.
This has not been demonstrated before, and under-
lines the importance of understanding national cul-
tural contexts when collecting and interpreting safety
culture data, and for establishing the directionality of
the national culture and safety culture relationship.
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